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CASE NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-Housing Discrimination-Federal Courts
May Order Metropolitan Area Remedy To Correct Wrongs Com-
mitted Solely Against City Residents Where Agencies Have Sta-
tutory Authority To Conduct Activities Outside the City Limits.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
Six residents of and applicants for public housing in the city of
Chicago initiated a class action claiming that the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) had violated the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution by discriminating against blacks in the selection of
tenants and sites for public housing.' The suit alleged that since
1950 a pattern existed by which CHA would locate blacks in pre-
dominantly black projects and limit their access into primarily
white projects.' Plaintiffs sought injunctive and other remedial re-
lief to prohibit such practices.3 The district court granted partial
summary judgment against CHA, citing that agency's discrimina-
tory policies and the existence of a quota system intended to mini-
mize black presence in four white projects.4 The court ordered CHA
to construct at least seven hundred housing units in predominantly
white areas before building any other units and further ordered that
75 percent of all units be located in white areas.5
Plaintiffs also brought a suit against the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) for a declaratory judgment that
HUD had assisted in effecting a racially discriminatory system of
public housing in the city of Chicago and for an injunction prevent-
ing HUD from using additional federal funds in connection with or
in support of the racially discriminatory aspects of the public hous-
1. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I1. 1969). The origi-
nal action began with seven plaintiffs. One died during the course of the litigation.
2. The court noted that CHA had established a racial quota to restrict the number of
black families residing in the public housing projects. The projects in question (mainly the
white projects), all built prior to 1944, had black tenant populations of 7 percent, 6 percent,
4 percent and 1 percent despite that the black population for all projects was about 90
percent. Evidence presented also indicated that the white projects were listed as being suita-
ble for white families only. Id. at 909.
3. 296 F. Supp. at 908.
4. Id.
5. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I1. 1969).
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ing system.' The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction.7 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and granted summary
judgment on the grounds that HUD had violated the fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 by its acquiescence and assistance in maintaining a racially
discriminatory system.'
On remand, the district court consolidated the two cases. It or-
dered HUD to comply with all pertinent federal and state statutes
and to abide by its holding against CHA.'I The court rejected plain-
tiffs' suggestion that the remedy apply throughout the entire metro-
politan area of Chicago rather than within the boundaries of the city
itself." The court of appeals reversed, holding that the remedial
plan must encompass the surrounding areas, 2 and that the district
court's rejection of such a plan was erroneous. 3
HUD appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that such an
order was impermissable because it constituted an undue
interference with the activities of local governments. 4 HUD also
asserted that the Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley"9 precluded
a metropolitan area remedy.'"
6. Plaintiffs filed suit against HUD at the same time as against CHA. An unpublished
order of the district court stayed all proceedings in the suit against HUD until disposition of
the case against CHA. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 (1976).
7. On September 1, 1970 the district court dismissed the case in an unpublished
memorandum decision. See Gautreaux v. Romney, Civil No. 66C1460 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept.
1, 1970).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), which states: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
9. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
10. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. I1. 1973). The district court, in so
deciding, stated:
[Tihe wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and solely against resi-
dents of the City. It has never been alleged that CHA and HUD discriminated or
fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs and, given the limits of CHA's juris-
diction, such claims could never be proved against the principal offender herein.
Id. at 691.
11. 363 F. Supp. at 691.
12. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 939.
14. 96 S. Ct. at 1546.
15. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
16. HUD relied primarily on the Court's opinion in Milliken. HUD argued that the restric-
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The Supreme Court held that Milliken did not per se limit reme-
dial orders to city boundaries and added that the instant case war-
ranted a metropolitan area remedy because HUD had violated the
Constitution and federal statutes in surrounding areas. 7
Since the Supreme Court decided that separate is not equal in
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I),"8 courts have been strug-
gling with remedies to eradicate racial discrimination. A question
has often been raised concerning the permissable extent of judicial
intrusion into local matters for the purpose of remedying violations
of the Constitution and of federal statutes. In attempting to estab-
lish guidelines for such remedial orders, the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) specifically authorized "the
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units
to achieve a system of determining admission to public schools on
a non-racial basis . . .,.
The principle most often cited to support any remedial measure
is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and
tions in Milliken meant that unless violations were found to exist in the surrounding areas,
and then only by the governing bodies of such areas, no metropolitan area remedy could be
ordered. 96 S. Ct. at 1545. See notes 23-32 infra.
17. 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). In so deciding, the Court stated:
In this case, it is entirely appropriate and consistent with Milliken to order CHA and
HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives for the respondents in the Chicago
suburbs. Here the wrong committed by HUD confined the respondents to segregated
public housing. The relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents' housing
options is the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits. That HUD recog-
nizes this reality is evident in its administration of federal housing assistance programs
through "housing market areas" encompassing "the geographic area 'within which all
dwelling units . . .' are in competition with one another as alternatives for the users
of housing." Department of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Techniques of
Housing Market Analysis 8 (Jan. 1970) quoting The Institute for Urban Land Use and
Housing Studies, Housing Market Analysis: A Study of Theory and Methods, c. II
(1953). (emphasis added).
Id. at 1547. This distinction between the city limits and "housing market areas" becomes
crucial as at times it appears that the terms are used interchangably by the Court. See note
46 infra.
18. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that maintenance of two separate educational sys-
tems based on race, constituted a violation of the equal protection clause); accord Griffin v.
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (local school choice program held to violate the equal protec-
tion clause as being in fact a scheme to promote segregation); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S.
526 (1963) (recreational facilities); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)
(public golf course); City of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public
beaches).
19. 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
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extent of the constitutional violation.2 ' In single district cases, the
courts have fashioned remedial orders without much difficulty.' For
example, courts have rearranged the attendance zones of individual
school districts into areas less likely to produce a segregative effect.
The power of the courts to order such remedies has never been
seriously questioned.2
Where several districts or disparate areas are involved the prob-
lem is more difficult. The Supreme Court faced this situation in
Milliken. 3 The Milliken plaintiffs, a class comprised of "all school
children in the City of Detroit, Michigan, and all Detroit resident
parents who have children of school age" charged that the Gover-
nor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Board of Educa-
tion, the Board of Education of the City of Detroit and others had
conducted a racially discriminatory school system in the city of
Detroit in violation of the Constitution. 4 The district court and
court of appeals authorized a remedy which involved school districts
outside the city of Detroit .21 That remedy required the consolidation
of the suburban school districts and those within the city of Detroit.
It also required the busing of suburban students to the city schools
and the busing of city residents (mostly black) to the suburban
schools. 2 The Supreme Court ruled that a plan involving Detroit's
surrounding school districts could not be implemented unless the
district court found an actual violation by those districts.27 Absent
such a showing, a metropolitan area remedy was inappropriate.2 1
20. United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33
(1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 403 U.S.
912 (1971).
21. Since the "nature and extent" of the violation involved only one district, the relief
requested and granted, included the district in question and no consideration was made in
relation to the surrounding areas. See note 20 supra.
22. The Court in deciding Milliken did not overrule any of the previous cases dealing with
remedial powers and, indeed, vigorously affirmed the remedies initiated in those cases. 418
U.S. 717 (1974). For a discussion of remedial orders in discrimination cases, with particular
emphasis on Milliken, see Comment, Desegregation-The Times They Are A-Changin', 3
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 245 (1975).
23. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
24. Id. at 722.
25. Id. at 730, 735.
26. Id. at 735.




Thus, the Supreme Court ordered that the remedy affect only those
school districts within the city of Detroit. 9
The Court in Milliken did not prohibit the implementation of all
or any metropolitan area relief."0 It merely attempted to establish
guidelines to aid federal courts in handling situations involving
more than one district. Thus, after Milliken, it is possible to con-
clude that a metropolitan area remedy is appropriate where there
are violations by the surrounding areas which have a segregative
effect on other districts.' Certain language in Milliken indicates
that any form of relief which would interfere with the rights and
powers of the local governments is inapplicable.2
Hills v. Gautreaux"3 considered both these possibilities. In decid-
ing that a metropolitan area remedy would be acceptable, the Court
initially set forth certain limitations noted in Milliken." Mr. Justice
Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court," agreed with Milliken that
federal courts have no power to extend a remedy into a district
which had not violated the Constitution." The Gautreaux opinion
concluded that Milliken "was actually based on the fundamental
29. Id. at 753.
30. "[An interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts
of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where
district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race." Id. at 745.
"This is not to say, however, that an interdistrict remedy of the sort approved by the Court
of Appeals would not be proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations. Were it to be
shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races by
drawing or redrawing school district lines, (citation omitted), by transfer of school units
between districts (citation omitted); or by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state
housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for transfer of pupils across district lines or for
restructuring of district lines might well be appropriate." Id. at 755. (Stewart J., concurring).
31. "Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside
by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district
remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." 418 U.S. at 744-45.
(emphasis added).
32. The Court in Milliken stated that "The Michigan educational structure involved in
this case, in common with most States, provides for a large measure of local control, and a
review of the scope and character of these local powers indicates the extent to which the
interdistrict remedy approved by the two courts could disrupt and alter the structure of
public education in Michigan." 418 U.S. at 742-43.
33. 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
34. Id. at 1543.
35. Justice John P. Stevens did not take part in the consideration of the decision. 96 S.
Ct. at 1550.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 1544.
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limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restruc-
ture the operation of local and state governmental entities." 7 and
noted that Milliken had found no violation by the surrounding
areas. " In pointing out this factual distinction, the Court set the
stage for approving a remedy which Milliken expressly rejected.
The Gautreaux Court appears to have taken its cue from state-
ments in Milliken itself regarding the possibility of a metropolitan
area remedy." The question remains whether Gautreaux maintains
or broadens the standards set up by Milliken.'" Although Milliken
dealt only with school districts within the city of Detroit,4 it did not
limit judicial intervention to a single city or district." The
Gautreaux Court's approval of a remedy encompassing both the city
of Chicago and the surrounding areas was based on the ability of
HUD and CHA to construct projects outside the Chicago city lim-
its. 3 Given the HUD and CHA constitutional violations and the
power of both defendants to conduct activities outside the city lim-
its, judicial intervention Was proper. What concerned the Milliken
Court was that existing districts would be rearranged to the point
of being unrecognizable and unmanageable." In dealing with "hous-




39. See note 30 supra.
40. See notes 30-32 supra.
41. 418 U.S. at 723.
42. Id. at 744-45.
43. 96 S. Ct. at 1546. The Court specifically rejected the court of appeals' argument that
the violation of the surrounding areas consisted of ten of twelve housing projects constructed
in close proximity to primarily white areas, stating that "[sluch unsupported speculation
falls far short of the demonstration of a 'significant segregative effect in another district'
discussed in the Milliken opinion." Id. at 1545, n.11.
Illinois statute permits a city housing authority to exercise its power in areas within three
miles of the city boundaries which are not located in another city, village or incorporated
town. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 /2, §§ 17(b), 27c (1965).
The Court also stated that "[in principle markets such as Chicago, the Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Area is coterminous with the housing market area." 96 S. Ct. at 1547, n.15.
44. 418 U.S. at 743.
45. 96 S. Ct. at 1547.
46. Id. (citation omitted). It is not clear why Justice Stewart uses the term "city limits
of Chicago." In the context of the decision and his prior discussion of "housing market areas,"
this would appear to be incorrect. See note 17 supra.
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An order against HUD and CHA regulating their conduct in the greater
metropolitan area will do no more than take into account HUD's expert
determination of the area relevant to the respondents' housing opportunities
and will thus be wholly commensurate with the "nature and extent of the
constitutional violation." To foreclose such relief solely because HUD's con-
stitutional violation took place within the city limits of Chicago would trans-
form Milliken's principled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial
authority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have
engaged in unconstitutional conduct.
The Court thus maintained the standards set forth in Milliken by
its finding that CHA and HUD had violated the Constitution and
that both had the power to act outside the boundaries of the city of
Chicago." It also dispelled any thought that Milliken affirmatively
prohibits any form of relief encompassing areas outside city bounda-
ries.48 A remedy which would include the "housing market areas"
used in HUD guidelines would be within the Milliken standards.
The Gautreaux Court's concentration on the statutory authority
afforded HUD and CHA suggests that the Court is inquiring into
who has power to affect policy decisions outside the city limits. After
finding a constitutional violation by the surrounding areas, the
Court will then determine who can most clearly rectify the situa-
tion. In Milliken, the school districts from Detroit lacked power to
act outside the city of Detroit." In Gautreaux, HUD and CHA had
such statutory authority to conduct activities outside the city limits
of Chicago.5 Therefore, a metropolitan area remedy would be or-
dered for those agencies which have already-existing authority to
function.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 1547.
48. Id.
49. It should also be noted that the Milliken Court was bothered by the prospects of
authorizing a metropolitan area remedy which would involve districts which were not before
it. In presenting the issues to be decided, Justice Burger stated:
We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to determine whether a federal court
may impose a multi-district, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation
problem . . . absent a meaningful opportunity for the included neighboring school
districts to present evidence or be heard on the propriety of a multidistrict remedy or
on the question of constitutional violations by those neighboring districts.
418 U.S. at 721-22. The Court then explained the procedures, in detail, excluding the neigh-
boring school districts from any consideration of a metropolitan area remedy. 418 U.S. at 728-
36. No such problem faced the Court in Gautreaux. All necessary parties participated in all
phases of the decision to consider a metropolitan area remedy.
50. See note 43 supra.
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Another important consideration in Milliken was that the remedy
not unduly interfere with the rights and powers of the local
government.5' HUD argued that a metropolitan area remedy would
lead to the precise interference prohibited by Milliken.5" The Court
rejected this contention stating that various state, local and federal
laws regulating the conduct of HUD and CHA would continue to
provide for local approval of any project before funds could be ad-
vanced.53 The Court stated:54
An order directed solely to HUD would not force unwilling localities to apply
for assistance under these programs but would merely reinforce the regula-
tions guiding HUD's determination of which of the locally authorized pro-
jects to assist with federal funds.
The Court also found support in a series of federal statutes which
call for federal and local cooperation in connection with public hous-
ing projects, as well as local authorization of such projects.55 While
local governments would have the power to authorize or reject pro-
jects suggested by HUD, the Constitution requires the federal gov-
ernment to refrain from funding projects which discriminate on the
basis of race.5" An order calling for a metropolitan area remedy
would thus be consistent with existing federal statutes and the prin-
ciple of local autonomy.
The Court stated that "a metropolitan relief order directed to
HUD would not consolidate or in any way restructure local govern-
mental units. The remedial decree would neither force suburban
governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor dis-
place the rights and powers accorded local government entities
under federal or state housing statutes or existing land use laws."57
The basis of the distinction which the Court so painstakingly
makes between Gautreaux and Milliken can be found in the differ-
ence between housing districts and school districts. The Gautreaux
51. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
52. 96 S. Ct. at 1546.
53. Id. at 1548.
54. Id. at 1549.
55. Id. citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1415(7)(b); 1421(a)(2) (1970); Id. § 1439(a)-(c) (Supp. IV,
1974).
56. 96 S. Ct. at 1548. This would appear to be merely an order to HUD that it comply
with existing statutes regarding funding and approval of public housing projects maintained
by systems whose policies are determined to be racially discriminatory.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 1550.
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Court noted that a metropolitan area remedy in Milliken would
have required a major restructuring of school districts, funding
plans, attendance zones and most importantly, a diminution of the
control exerted by the local boards.5" The Milliken Court was fearful
of any interference with these school boards and of any lessening of
their traditional powers.59 The authority over housing projects,
which have traditionally employed both state and federal funds,
presents a different situation. 0 The remedy approved by the
Gautreaux Court left district lines and authority over approval and
funding unchanged. " While the remedy involved a metropolitan
area, the Gautreaux Court avoided the interference with the struc-
ture and functions of the local governments which the Milliken
Court found objectionable.
The Gautreaux Court, however, did not indicate whether ap-
proval of a metropolitan area remedy in future cases will depend on
such abstract and complex standards as federal involvement in local
governments. While interference with local authorities in Gautreaux
would appear to be minimal, the Court makes no mention of how
much interference it would permit in cases where other criteria (e.g.,
constitutional violations by local governments) had been met. Nor
does it state whether metropolitan area remedies would be proper
where there would be little or no interference with suburban govern-
ments but where the violations had been committed by city govern-
ments without statutory authority to act outside their own bounda-
ries.62
Nevertheless, Gautreaux puts to rest the notion that Milliken
58. Id. at 1546-47.
59. The Court in Milliken stated that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the educational process." 418 U.S. at 741-42.
60. That there is no existing scheme of statutes in the area of education, such as is found
in the housing area, provides the Court with a means of distinguishing Milliken, while accept-
ing its limitations.
61. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
62. The Gautreaux Court indicated that the "more substantial question under Milliken
is whether an order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chicago's boundaries would
impermissibly interfere with local governments . . . .". 96 S. Ct. at 1547. However, it re-
solved the issue by again analyzing the statutory authority conferred on HUD to act in
conjunction with local governments. This seems to imply that such powers must be estab-
lished before the Court will sanction a metropolitan area remedy.
1976]
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created a complete bar to metropolitan area relief. It is apparent
that courts in the future may consider factors other than geographic
locations and demographic boundaries. 3 The viability of metropoli-
tan area remedies as a form of federal relief will, however, be
dependent on how far the Court is willing to resist the strictures of
Milliken in future cases. 4
Andres J. Valdespino
63. Zoning ordinances of eleven municipalities that failed to afford opportunity for con-
struction of low and middle income housing to the extent of their respective fair share of the
community housing needs were declared unconstitutional by a state trial court in New Jersey.
The court issued an order requiring the municipalities to increase their proportion of low and
moderate income housing to reflect the population of the entire county. Urban League v.
Borough of Cartaret, No. C-4122-73, (N.J. Super., May 17, 1976).
64. In a letter dated June 7, 1976, HUD announced the initiation of a one-year plan by
which it would house approximately four hundred minority families in existing housing
throughout the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Under the plan, no more
than 25 percent of these families will be located in any portion of the city of Chicago or in
minority areas outside the city limits. The Gautreaux plaintiffs agreed to postpone requesting
a metropolitan area relief order from the district court for nine months from July 1, 1976. 3
CCH, POVERTY LAW REPORTS 22806 (1976).
